Safety optimization: a combination of fault tree analysis and optimization techniques by Ortmeier, Frank & Reif, Wolfgang (Prof. Dr.)
1Safety Optimization: A combination of fault tree
analysis and optimization techniques
Frank Ortmeier Wolfgang Reif
Abstract—
We present a new form of quantitative safety analysis -
safety optimization. This method is a combination of fault
tree analysis(FTA) and mathematical optimization tech-
niques. With the use of the results of FTA, statistics, and
a quantification of the costs of hazards, it allows to find the
optimal configuration of a given system with respect to op-
posed safety requirements. Furthermore, the system may
not only be examined for safety, but usability as well.
We illustrate this method on a real-world case study: the
height control system of the Elbtunnel in Hamburg. Safety
optimization showed some significant problems in trustwor-
thiness of the system, yielded optimal values for configura-
tion of free parameters and showed possible modifications
to improve the system.
Index Terms—fault tree analysis, dependability, optimiza-
tion, safety analysis, embedded systems
I. Introduction
In this paper we describe how mathematical optimiza-
tion and safety analysis can be combined. We call this
technique safety optimization. We applied this method on
a case study - the height control system of the Elbtunnel in
Hamburg and will illustrate the method on this example.
This work has been developed within the ForMoSA project
which is part of the german research foundations priority
progam “Integrating software specification techniques for
engineering applications”.
Many modern books about safety [6][7][14] do not cover
quantitative methods or only cover them on the fringes.
This is, because quantitative methods usually rely heavily
on statistics. So they are often seen as a problem of math-
ematics. However, it can improve safety analysis a lot,
if good interfaces between mathematics and statistics are
provided. Safety optimization is an enhancement to the
well-known fault tree analysis (FTA) [16][2] which makes
it easy to integrate statistics and optimization techniques
into safety analysis. The new aspect - compared to tra-
ditional FTA - is that we build a statistical model of the
environment in addition to the components’ failure prob-
abilities known from quantitative FTA. With this model,
the results of quantitative FTA, and a cost function opti-
mal configuration values for free parameters may be found
as solutions of an optimization problem. Many real world
applications have free parameters, which influence safety
requirements: the tolerance of a speed indicator, accepted
time delay between request and answers or the average
maintenance interval are all free parameters of different
systems. Such parameters are normally chosen on a ba-
sis of previous experience and fine tuned once the system
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starts working. However, bad choices only become obvious
when some hazards occur. So it would be very helpful, if
these parameters could be estimated in advance. This is
what safety optimization does.
In Sect. II we give a brief introduction of FTA including
quantitative FTA. The theoretical foundations of safety
optimization are part of Sect. III. An application of safety
optimization on a real world case study is presented in
Sect. IV. Limitations and future work are presented in
Sect. V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Fault Tree Analysis
In this section we start with a brief introduction into
fault tree analysis(FTA). FTA is a top down technique to
determine the possible basic component failures (primary
failures) of a bad or catastrophic situation which must be
avoided. This situation is called hazard.
The hazard or top event is always the root of the fault
tree and primary failures are its leaves. All inner nodes of
the tree are called intermediate events. Starting with the
top event the tree is generated by determining the immedi-
ate causes that lead to the top event. They are connected
to their consequence through a gate. The gate indicates if
all (and-gate) or any (or-gate) of the causes are necessary
to make the consequence happen. the INHIBT-gate states,
that the cause is only critical if some environmental con-
dition holds. Unlike all other nodes of the fault tree, this
condition must not be a failure or undesired event. The
leaves of a fault tree are primary failures which are not
investigated further. Figure 1 shows the symbols for fault
tree gates.
intermediate event
and gate
or gate
primary failure
inhibit gate
Fig. 1. fault tree symbols
The fault tree in figure 2 is part of the FTA of the Elb-
tunnel height control system which we will describe in de-
tail in Sect. IV. This tree describes, that the immediate
causes of the top event - collision - are that either the driver
ignores some stop signals OR (this means the causes are
connected through an OR-gate) that the signals are not
turned on. The first cause is a primary failure. We can do
nothing about it, but to disbar the driver from his license.
The second cause is an intermediate event. Its immediate
causes are a) that the signal lights are out of order or b)
the signals were not activated. Again the first one is a
2Signal out
of order
Signal not on
Signal not activated
OHV ignores
signal
...
Collision
Fig. 2. Collision fault tree
primary failure and the second is an intermediate event,
which has to be investigated further. This procedure has
to be applied recursively to all causes until the desired level
of granularity is reached (this means all causes are primary
failures that won’t be investigated further).
In the remainder of this section we will describe the most
important terms of FTA in such detail, that the concept
of safety optimization can be explained later.
A. Primary Failures and Hazards
For quantitative analysis roots and leaves—i.e. haz-
ards and primary failures—are important. Let F :=
{PF1, .., PFn} be the set of all primary failures PFi and
H := {H1, .., Hm} the set of all hazards Hi under consid-
eration.
For each hazard Hi a separate fault tree has to be con-
structed, that describes which combination of basic causes
(= primary failures) may be the reason for the hazard.
B. Minimal cut sets
An interesting result of fault tree analysis are the min-
imal cut sets. A cut set CSHi ⊆ F for a hazard Hi is a
set of primary failures, which together form a threat. This
means if all primary failures of the cut set take place, then
the hazard may occur.
Minimal cut sets MCSHi ⊆ F for a hazard Hi are cut
sets, such that preventing one element of each minimal
cut set prevents the hazard from occurring. The set of
all minimal cut sets for a hazard Hi may be automati-
cally generated from the fault tree[16]. We call this set
MCSSHi . So minimal cut sets describe qualitatively the
dependency between hazards and primary failures. Mini-
mal cut sets may be derived from the structure of the fault
tree automatically.
Even more interesting for real world applications is the
quantitative one i.e. the dependency between the proba-
bility of occurrence of the cut sets and the hazard. This
question can be answered with quantitative FTA.
C. Calculating probabilities
For calculating probabilities we use a standard formula
for calculating hazard probabilities from fault trees[16]. It
calculates the probability of a cut set as the product of the
probabilities of all its elements. The hazard’s probability
is calculated as the sum of all its minimal cut sets prob-
abilities. So the probability of a hazard Hi is calculated
as:
P (Hi) :=
∑
MCS∈MCSSHi
P (MCS) (1)
where P (MCS) :=
∏
PF∈MCS
P (PF )
This formula is widely used in engineering and broadly
accepted, but uses some assumptions about statistical in-
dependence. All primary failure are assumed to be pairwise
independent. This hold for many applications. If statis-
tical correlation has to be examined, FTA is not a good
choice and another approach like common cause analysis
or—on the formal side—stochastic model checking [1] has
to be used and the probability of the minimal cut sets and
hazards have to be calculated separately. this formula alse
neglects second and higher-order terms in the sum. This
is in practice no problem as failure probabilities are very
small.
In this paper we stick with the assumption of statistical
independence and use the standard formulae as starting
point for our extension of FTA.
D. Generalizations
So far this is the standard method of applying quanti-
tative FTA. But for our purposes this is not enough. As
(i) for this point of view the worst case is always assumed.
This means, all other environmental inputs are as “bad” as
possible. Another deficiency is (ii) the use of fixed proba-
bilities for failures. In reality these probabilities are usually
not constant, but rather depend on some parameters. To
overcome these problems, we generalize quantitative FTA
by introducing two new types of probabilities: constraint
probabilities and parameterized failure probabilities.
D.1 Constraint probabilities
Most of the cut sets cause the hazard only if one or
more constraints are fulfilled. Sometimes a constraint must
hold for all cut sets and sometimes only for some of them.
For example the failure of a critical cooling unit is only
dangerous if the system which has to be cooled is working.
If it is turned off, then the failure of such a cooling unit
will not have any effect onto the super system. There exist
quite some extension for FTA which consider such effects
on a qualitative basis. The qualitative dependence between
such constraints, cut sets and hazards is then integrated in
the fault tree with so called INHIBIT-gates (see figure 1).
An INHIBIT-gate states a condition or constraint which
has to be fulfilled such that the failure cause makes the
consequence happen. This condition need not necessarily
be a failure, but can also be some environmental influence.
Although some types of FTA respect such dependencies
in a qualitative manner, they are in general neglected for
quantitative FTA.
We introduce constraint probabilities for quantitative
analysis which reflect how probable it is that the inputs
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from the environment are “bad” enough to make the haz-
ard happen. So we refine definition of a cut sets probability
to get a better approximation:
P (CS) := P (Constraints)
∏
PF∈CS
P (PF ) (2)
If one chooses P(Constraints)=1, it means the environ-
ment always behaves as bad as possible and one gets the
same formula as before. However, if one can estimate
P(Constraints) a priori, then the results will be much more
precise. This estimation can be approximated by calculat-
ing the probabilities of all conditions in INHIBIT-gates
along the paths through the tree from the hazard to the
elements of the cut sets. An upper bound fpr the con-
straint probability is then the product of all conditions’
probabilities if statistical independence holds; if not then
the maximum is an upper bound for it.
In practice these numbers are really hard to calculate
exactly. So most of the time they are only approximated.
But even if they can not be approximated very well, they
still may be a great help for safety analysis. This is, be-
cause variation of the constraints allows to examine the
behavior of the system in different working environments.
This can give good advice, when trying to estimate how
the system will scale in future. The benefit of this last
methodology becomes obvious in the case study of Sect.
IV.
D.2 Parameterized probabilities
The second important generalization we made is that we
not only use constant failure probabilities for primary fail-
ures, but allow parameterized probabilities. This means,
if the probability of primary failures PF (e.g. a relay fails
to close) depends on some parameter X (e.g. the spring
tension of the relay), we use a functional mapping between
X and P(PF) and write P(PF)(X).
P (PF ) : Domain(X) → [0, 1]
In principle, there is no restriction on the domain of X, as
they only affect which methods are applicable for the solu-
tion of the resulting optimization problem. But finite and
discrete domains are in general less interesting and rare.
In practice P(PF) is usually a (continuous) probabilistic
distribution. If the probabilities depend on more then one
parameter, then take X as the vector of all involved pa-
rameters.
All instances of failure probabilities are substituted with
the according function. The algorithm for calculating the
probability of a cut set is not changed. So the probability
of a cut set is then also function of one or more variables.
The same is true for the hazards’ probabilities and formula
1 now rewrites to:
P (Hi)(X) =
∑
MCS∈MCSSHi
P (MCS)(X) (3)
P (Hi)(X) =
∑
MCS∈MCSSHi
∏
PF∈MCS
P (PF )(X) (4)
Note, that the probabilities of cut sets and hazards are
no longer fixed numbers, but rather functions of the free
parameters of the system. We call these functions param-
eterized probabilities.
III. Safety Optimization
In this section we describe the combination of quantita-
tive fault tree analysis and optimization techniques, which
leads to safety optimization. The basic idea is as sim-
ple as effective. In practice for most systems safety is a
tradeoff between different undesired events. For example
in aviations the main goal of a pre-flight safety check on an
airplane before start is to make sure the aircraft is working
correctly and will not crash. However, another important
goal of the safety check is that an aircraft, which allows
safe flight must not fail the check. Assume that one part
of the check is aberration of the air speed indicator. Then
it is obvious that the smaller the allowed tolerance is, the
safer the airplane operation will be. On the other hand to
small acceptable tolerances will result in many safe aircraft
failing the pre-flight check and thus in delay or canceled
flights. So what is the solution? Its of course some middle
value between zero tolerance and arbitrary tolerance1.
This is exactly the point where safety optimization
works. It uses mathematical optimization to find the best
value for this tolerance parameter. To do this we only need
one more information: the cost function.
A. Cost function
To do mathematical analysis, a cost function is needed.
A cost function describes the total costs that all hazards
together cause in average to the operator. This is done by
risk assessment. The cost of each hazard will be defined.
It is common practice—even as it may seem un-ethical—
to do this in cash (e.g. one dead person is calculated with
2.7M $ in US railways organizations).
More important for the operators of the system are the
mean costs. These are the costs, which have to be ex-
pected. These costs depend on the probability of occur-
rence and absolute cost of the hazard. In many cases cost
functions are simply the weighted sum of hazards’ proba-
bilities. Where the weights represent the costs associated
with each hazard.
fcost(P (H1), .., P (Hm)) := Σ
m
i=1CostHiP (Hi) (5)
In our approach, the probabilities of the hazards P (Hi)
are not, as for standard quantitative FTA, necessarily con-
stants, but rather functions of free parameters X1...Xl
2 if
the contributing cut sets are described by parameterized
probabilities (see 3). So the cost function can be expressed
as function of the free parameters X1...Xl. This allows us
1 We are not arguing for safety leaks which originated in design
flaws, to be left open because of the costs. This approach only ad-
dresses hardware failure which can not ultimately be avoided.
2 In reality, not every hazard Hi depends on all free parame-
ters X1...Xl, but rather only on a subset. Therefore, we write
P (Hi(Xi,1, ..., Xi,ni )) in equation 6.
4to use optimization techniques.
fcost(X1, ..., Xl) := Σ
m
i=1CostHi(P (Hi(Xi,1, ..., Xi,ni))
(6)
B. Mathematical optimization
Once the cost function is defined the problem is not any
more a safety analysis problem but only a mathematical
one. The goal is to choose the free parameters X1...Xl such
that the cost function is minimized. So the problem is:
Find (x1, ...xl) such that : fcost(x1, ..., xl) = minX1,...,Xlfcost
To guarantee the existence of the minimum we restrict
the real value domains to be compact intervals. This prob-
lem can then be solved with different methods. In simple
cases analytical solutions may be found. If the problem is
more complex and the cost function still smooth enough
(e.g. twice-continuously differentiable) then there exist a
lot of algorithms from the domain of nonlinear program-
ming to solve the problem. The most simple one is the
gradient method which finds local minima by calculating
gradients iteratively and always following the steepest de-
scent. But there exists a wide variety of more elaborate
and efficient algorithms. A good introduction to optimiza-
tion of nonlinear problems may be found in [4] and [8].
If there are only two free variables (as in the following
example) and the functions are smooth, than the solutions
may be found by using a 3D plot of the cost function and
zooming into it. Even if a specific optimization problem is
neither analytically nor numerically solvable, this method
can yield some results by testing possible combinations. It
is possible to test large number of combinations in very
short time. So this technique gives a good impression
about the quantitative dependencies between mean costs
and free parameters.
IV. An example: The Elbtunnel
In this section we will apply the presented technique
step by step to a real world case study: the height control
system of the Elbtunnel in Hamburg. We will give a short
summary of the problem and show the most interesting
parts of the analysis and the results.
The Elbtunnel is a road tunnel beneath the river Elbe
in Hamburg. Until end 2002 this tunnel consisted of three
identical tubes with two driving lanes each. Late 2002 a
new, fourth tube went into operation. This new tube is
different. It is bigger and allows the crossing of vehicles,
which are too big for the old three tubes. Furthermore, the
tunnel has a dynamic traffic control which switches driving
directions from north to south and vice versa in the two
middle tubes according to traffic needs. This is done by an
electronic traffic control, underground signals, and electric
road signs. Figure 3 shows the layout of the tunnel. The
new, bigger tube is tube number 4.
We will consider only a small part of the whole project,
the height control. This system must ensure, that vehicles,
which are to high for the old three tubes, may only enter
W M E4
Fig. 3. Layout of the tunnel
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Fig. 4. Control of the northern entrance
the new tube. Otherwise an emergency halt should be
signaled automatically.
A. The height control system
In the following, we will distinguish between normal cars,
high vehicles (HVs) e.g. normal trucks or buses, which may
drive through all tubes and overhigh vehicles (OHVs) e.g.
extra large trucks, which can only drive through the new,
fourth tube.
In this paper we will only discuss the height control sys-
tem for the northern entrance of the tunnel; the southern
end is less complex, as no OHV at all may pass the tunnel
in that direction (they have to take a nearby bridge). The
control for the northern entrance is shown in figure 4.
The system uses two different types of sensors. Light
barriers (LB) are scanning all lanes of one direction to de-
tect, if an OHV passes. For technical reasons they cannot
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be installed in such a way, that they only supervise one
lane. Therefore overhead detectors (OD) are necessary to
detect, on which lane an OHV passes. The ODs can dis-
tinguish vehicles (e.g. cars) from high vehicles (e.g. buses,
trucks), but not HVs from OHVs (but light barriers can!).
If the height control detects an OHV heading towards a
different than the fourth tube, then an emergency stop,
locking the tunnel entrance, is signaled.
The idea of the height control is, that the detection
starts, if an OHV enters zone1 (see figure 4) at light barrier
LBpre. This results in activation of LBpost. To prevent un-
necessary alarms through faulty triggering of LBpre, LBpost
will be switched off after expiration of a 30-minutes-timer
(called timer1). Road traffic regulations require, that af-
ter LBpre both HVs and OHVs have to drive on the right
lane through tunnel 4. If nevertheless an OHV drives on
the left lane towards the west-tube, detected trough the
combination of LBpost and ODleft, an emergency stop is
triggered.
If the OHV drives on the right lane through LBpost, it
is still possible for the driver to switch in zone2 to the
left lanes and drive to the west- or mid-tube. To detect
this situation, the height control uses the ODfinal detector.
This sensor is activated by LBpost and will be kept active
for the next 30 minutes (called timer2).
For safe operation it is necessary, that after the location
of ODfinal it is impossible to switch lanes. We already pre-
sented a safety analysis of this system in [10] consisting
of verification of functional properties and FTA. With for-
mal verification using the SMV-tool[9] we discovered a de-
sign flaw, which resulted in a possible hazard if two OHVs
passed LBpre simultaneously. After presenting solutions
to this problem, we could proof functional correctness for
the collision hazards. For false alarms we could show, that
it there were only two possibilities for false alarms: a high
vehicle at ODLeft while an OHV passes ODRight or a HV
at ODFinal. After consultation with the engineers both
problems were said to be of minor importance, because in
both cases a driver neglects road traffic regulations.
We also discovered by FTA that the runtimes of the
timers are crucial to the system, but could not assess their
exact effects onto the system. We will now only focus on
finding optimal values for the runtimes of these timers and
evaluate the design in different environments.
B. Statistical model of the Elbtunnel
B.1 Primary failure and hazards
There are two different, interesting hazards for the Elb-
tunnel height control which we analyzed - the collision
(HCol) of an OHV with the tunnel entrance and the trip-
ping of a false alarm (HAlr). For both a separate fault
tree has to be built. It is clear that it is not possible to
minimize both risks at the same time. We could also give
formal proof for this by doing formal FTA [12]. The pri-
mary failures can be divided into four different types:
• False Detection (FD): The sensor does indicate a ve-
hicle, although there is none. Possible for all sensors.
• Miss Detection (MD): The sensor does not indicate
a vehicle, although there is one. Only possible for
microwave sensors.
• Overtime (OT): Actual driving time of an OHV ex-
ceeds the runtime of a timer. Possible for timer 1 and
timer 2.
• High vehicles (HV): A high vehicle beneath an over-
head detector is interpreted as an OHV.
FDs are possible for all sensors, while MD and HV is
only interesting for OD-type sensors. We write FDODfinal
as abbreviation for false detection at overhead detector
ODfinal and analogously for all other sensors. Overtime
failures can occur in zone 1 and zone 2. We write OT1
resp. OT2.
Note, that the last item (HV) is not a failure in the tra-
ditional sense, as overhead detectors can not distinguish
between high vehicles and OHVs, high vehicles at the lo-
cation of the sensors are (incorrectly) interpreted as OHVs.
For the control system this has the same effect as a FD of
the sensor.
In notation of Sect. II and III we get:
H = {HCol, HAlr} and F={HVODleft , FDODleft ,
MDODleft , HVODfinal , FDODfinal ,MDODfinal , OT1, OT2,
FDLBpre , FDLBpost}.
We do not consider failures outside the detection sys-
tem like broken stop signals or drivers who are ignoring
an emergency halt. Defects in the micro-controller and
the timers have also been neglected. It is estimated, that
failure of these components is by orders of magnitude (at
least 2) smaller then misdetection or false detection of the
sensory devices.
B.2 Minimal cut sets
For the hazard “collision” almost all cut sets are single
point of failures. The two most important ones are those,
that are caused by traffic jams in zone 1 resp. zone 2.
In our notation: {OT1} and {OT2}. The other minimal
cut sets are left out here for better readability. We write
Pconst1 for their combined probability.
False alarms may be triggered by {HVODleft},
{HVODfinal}, {FDODleft}, or {FDODfinal}. These are
also all single point of failures. It is interesting to note,
that all these failures are only then single point of failures,
if there is an OHV present in the controlled area. We will
only consider {HVODfinal} in detail in this paper. In fact
it turns out that this will be the dominating factor in the
hazards HAlr overall probability by two orders of magni-
tude. We accumulate the probability of all other cut sets
in Pconst2 . So we get the following formulae for the hazards
probabilities (see Sect. II-C):
P (HCol) = Pconst1 + P (OT1) + P (OT2)
P (HAlr) = Pconst2 + P (HVODfinal)
B.3 Constraint probabilities
Now we will introduce constraint probabilities. When
looking at P (HAlr) it is clear, that not all HVs at ODfinal
will trigger a false alarm. A false alarm is only triggered
6if the sensor is activated. This means either a) an OHV
has activated it or b) both light barriers had misdetec-
tions before. So we introduce the constraint probability
for HVODfinal :
Pconstraint1 = P (OHV ) + (1− P (OHV ))∗
∗P (FDLBpre) ∗ P (FDLBpost)
The first term in the sum refers to a) and the second
to b). P(OHV) is the possibility for an OHV to be in
the controlled area. So analogously to Sect. II-D we can
now calculate the constrained probability for the cut set
HVODfinal :
Pconstrained(HVODfinal) = Pconstraint1 ∗ P (HVODfinal)
The cut sets {OT1}and {OT2} are treated in the same man-
ner. For all other cut sets we will include the constraint
probabilities into Pconst1 resp. Pconst2 . In the end we get
the following formulae3 for the hazards probabilities:
P (HCol) = Pconst1
+P (OHV critical) ∗ P (OT1)
+P (OHV critical) ∗ (1− P (OT1)) ∗ P (OT2)
P (HAlr) = Pconst2 + (P (OHV ) + (1− P (OHV ))∗
∗P (FDLBpre) ∗ P (FDLBpost)) ∗ P (HVODfinal)
So these formulae respect information about how probable
a “bad” behavior of the environment is.
C. Parameterized probabilities
We will now introduce parameterized probabilities. It is
obvious, that the probability for an OHV to get stuck in
a traffic jam such that it needs more than the maximum
runtime of the timers P(OT1) resp. P(OT2), depends on
the runtimes. In statistics there exist quite a lot of distri-
butions[13], which describe such dependencies.
A good model for driving time of OHVs from LBpre to
LBpost and from LBpost to the tunnel is normal distribu-
tion (mean time µ = 4 minutes, standard deviation σ =
2 minutes). POHV1/2(Time ≤ T ) denotes the probability
for a driving time ≤ T. We can then calculate P(OT1) in
dependence of the runtime T1 of timer 1:
P (OT1)(T1) = 1− POHV1(Time ≤ T1)
where
POHV1(Time ≤ T ) :=
1∫
∞
0
exp(−
(x−µ)2
2σ2
)dx
∫ T
0
exp(− (x−µ)
2
2σ2 )dx
In the same manner parameterized probabilities for
P(OT2)(T2), P(HVODfinal)(T2), and P(FDLBpost)(T1)
are calculated. We now substitute the parameterized for-
mulae into the formulae for the probabilities of the hazards
making them parameterized as well:
P (HCol)(T1, T2) = Pconst1 + P (OHV critical)∗
∗(P (OT1)(T1) + (1− P (OT1)(T1)) ∗ P (OT2)(T2))
P (HAlr)(T1, T2) = Pconst2 + ∗P (FDLBpost)(T1)∗
∗(P (OHV ) + (1− P (OHV )) ∗ P (FDLBpre))
3 P(OHV critical) denotes the probability of an OHV driving to-
wards west-tube or mid-tube
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Fig. 5. The cost function around its minimum
Now we can easily calculate the probabilities for each haz-
ard for an arbitrary choices of the timer runtimes. But
to do optimization we need to formulate a connection be-
tween the two contrary hazards. Cost functions form this
link.
C.1 Cost function
The cost function describes the relative importance of
each hazard. In our example a good guess for the costs is,
that collisions cost roughly 100.000 times the money a false
alarm costs. So we get the cost function as the weighted
sum of hazards probabilities:
fcost(T1, T2) :=
P (HCol)(T1, T2) ∗ 100000 + P (HAlr)(T1, T1) ∗ 1
The variables T1 and T2 represent the runtimes of the
timers. P (HCol)(T1, T2) resp. P (HAlr)(T1, T2) denote
the probabilities defined in the last paragraph.
C.2 Results
Figure 5 shows the cost function—plotted against the
runtime of timer1 and timer2—around the minimum.
Closer examination yields optimal parameters for the timer
runtimes of approximately 19 resp. 15.6 minutes for timer
1 resp. 2. This is much less than the initial “guesses” of 30
minutes of the safety engineer and results in an improve-
ment of about 10% in false alarm risk, while the risk for
collision does not change (less then 0.1%). It also shows,
that timer 1 may be chosen more conservatively than timer
2.
This result was somewhat surprising. Why does the false
alarm risk only decrease by 10%, although the detection
system is now only active half the time than before? And
why is the dependency of the risk not symmetric in the
free parameters? To answer this question we make use of
the fact, that parameterized probabilities allow us to also
examine the system in different working environments. We
introduce an additional parameterized probability in the
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Fig. 6. Probability of false alarms, if an OHV is driving correctly
system - the rate of correct driving OHVs. This allows
us to answer the question: How does the control scale if
the traffic — especially the number of OHVs — increases.
Figure 6 (graph “without LB4”) shows the probability of
a false alarm against the runtime of timer 2 assuming that
an OHV is in the controlled area.
This result is alarming. It means, that even with the
suggested, reduced runtime of 15.6 minutes for timer 2
more than 80% of the correct driving OHVs will trigger
an alarm4. This makes the complex control system almost
obsolete, as the same result could have been achieved much
easier (for example by only using one light barrier and lock
the tunnel whenever an OHV is detected), and is a major
design flaw in the control.
The reason for this phenomenon can also be discovered
by very precise informal analysis of the system (but neither
we nor the engineers were aware of it before we did this
analysis). When looking at the design of the system in
figure 4 it becomes clear, that all countermeasures taken
to avoid false alarms only aim at avoiding false alarms
triggered by false detections of one of the light barriers.
This is the main source of false alarms of the old height
control of the former three tubes (there were no ODs at all
as every OHV had to be stopped anyways).
But now the scenario is different. If OHV traffic in-
creases, then the ODfinal sensor will almost constantly
be activated and this sensor will ultimately decided if an
alarm has to be triggered or not. So the risk of a false
alarm is then basically the probability of a FD at ODfinal
or a HV there. While we have some influence on the fail-
ure probability, our influence on high vehicles is limited.
Although road regulations require trucks, buses and vans
to drive on the right lane, some drivers always ignore this
rule! The only possibility to reduce the the risk is to reduce
the activation time of the sensor, but this is not feasible,
as a runtime of less than 10 minutes will make the risk for
4 For a runtime of 30 minutes it is more than 95%.
a collision unacceptably high.
This obvious design flaw has neither been discovered by
formal safety analysis with model checking nor by the en-
gineers. The problem is, that the rigorous formal methods
only give qualitative answers. The problems here lies in
the logics. A statement can either be true or false, not
possibly true5. Formal FTA showed that a false detection
of ODfinal is a critical single point of failure. Quantitative
FTA did not discover the flaw, as normally no environmen-
tal constraints are considered there. It was only discovered,
when we tested the concept of constrained probabilities on
this case study and we were surprised by the results in the
beginning as well. Because we introduced the frequency of
correctly driving OHVs as a free parameter, we just had
to take a look at the graph to discover the flaw.
The solution to this problem is fairly simple. It can
be solved by introducing a new light barrier right in front
of the entrance of tube 4 and use it to stop timer 2 (a
counter for OHVs in zone 2 is then needed as well). The
result of this light barrier is, that the mean activation time
of ODFinal is now the mean time of an OHV needs to pass
Zone2. The effect of this light barrier in the same scenario
is shown in figure 6 (graph “with LB4”). The system will
still ring the bell for a very high number(≈ 40%) of correct
driving OHV, but this design can be implemented without
major changes. A much better solution would be to install
the light barrier at ODfinal. This would lower the false
alarm rate to approx. 4% of the OHVs, because the de-
tector ODFinal would then only be critical, while an OHV
passes the light barrier or the light barrier has a FD. How-
ever, it is not clear if this is physically possible with the
current road layout and available light barriers.
V. Limitations and future work
It is our experience, that the results of this analysis de-
pend a lot on how well the statistical model reflects real-
ity. This problem can not be circumvented, but it’s only a
question of math and engineering to find good guesses for
probabilities and distributions.
However, even if the statistics are not very elaborate,
safety optimization can help by giving a rough estimation
about how important the different parameters are. Fur-
thermore constrained probabilities allow to “try” different
statistical assumptions and at least get an estimation for
the worst case.
An interesting point for future work is to combine safety
optimization and formal fault tree analysis [12][15]. This
could make it much easier to find the difficult constrained
probabilities as a formal proof of a cause-consequence re-
lationship also implicitly contains information about the
necessary environmental inputs. In fact the formalization
of INHIBIT-gates yield necessary condition for the con-
straints. So it is a promising idea to collect all INHIBIT-
gates along the paths from the fault tree root to the leaves
of a cut set. The result should be a formal description
5 At least standard formal methods. Logics like probabilistic CTL
(PCTL), combined with probabilistic model checking[1] can also ad-
dress such problems.
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force the hazard’s occurrence.
However, the problem of dependent probabilities stays.
This is especially true for constraint probabilities. They
are often dependent. Formal methods might help there,
too. For example if logical implication of two constraints
(A → B) can be shown and the constraints are described
by predicate logic formulae, then P(A) is an upper bound
for P(B). It would be interesting to investigate, if the de-
pendency can be expressed for other cases as well. The
natural next step is to drop the restriction to predicate
logic constraints and examine constraints with duration or
temporal orderings.
Another open end for research is of course to find lim-
itations which other distributions and cost functions are
necessary in real-world applications. This also raises the
question in which cases the resulting optimization problem
stays solvable. An interesting connection is to reduce the
whole optimization problem to a problem of stochastic pro-
gramming, which is a branch of mathematical optimization
that deals with probability distributions.
We found, that in practice the results of different anal-
ysis methods like formal verification, FTA, quantitative
FTA and safety optimization may be used as input data
for each other, so an integrated methodology will make
safety analysis a lot more systematic, easier and cheaper.
This is—together with intuitive tool support—also a key
feature for the possible application in industrial practice.
VI. Conclusion
Our experience is that it is important to combine differ-
ent techniques for safety analysis. This is because different
methods not only examine different aspects of the system,
but also give contrary views [5].
Safety optimization is one such technique. The idea of
safety optimization is as simple as promising: do a fault
tree analysis of the systems hazards, use statistical distri-
bution for failure probabilities, estimate the costs of each
hazard with a cost function and do mathematical opti-
mization. The result will be an optimal configuration of
the system with respect to the examined hazards.
While traditional safety analysis does not assess the
problem of usability and trustworthiness, such issue may
be considered with parameterized probabilities as well. It
tunrs out, that analyzing the system in different working
environments and analyzing the effect of free parameters
can be treated in the same way. But here the focus lies in
the analysis, as it is only of theoretical interest what the
optimal working environment of the system might be.
Safety optimization is an extension of fault tree analysis.
It extends the quantitative aspects of FTA. Together with
formal FTA [12][11] which extends the qualitative aspects
and allows to prove that the cause-consequence relation-
ship between primary failures and hazards is correct, this
analysis is of very high significance.
We illustrated the benefits of the new method with a
real world case-study: the Elbtunnel in Hamburg. The
safety analysis of the height control for the Elbtunnel has
shown the benefit of the combination of all these meth-
ods. Formal verification has shown a design flaw, which
resulted in a safety gap. Fault tree analysis identified crit-
ical failure and yielded minimal cut sets for quantitative
analysis. Quantitative safety analysis, showed the impor-
tance of different failure modes and gave upper bounds for
hazard probabilities. Safety optimization yielded optimal
configuration values for free parameters and discovered a
major design flaw. This flaw has neither been detected by
the system engineers nor by a formal verification of cor-
rectness. Safety optimization has made the system safer,
led to design improvements and increased overall system
quality.
In conclusion, we find that examining only hazards and
estimating their probabilities is not enough. It is rather
important to examine all hazards of a system in parallel,
its intention and the planned working environment to get
a good impression of it. A combined approach of tradi-
tional safety analysis, formal methods and mathematics
can accomplish this. Such an integrated approach is being
developed within the ForMoSA research project [3][11].
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